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The Relative Electoral Impact of Central Party Co-ordination and Size of Party 
Membership at Constituency Level
1
 
 
Over the past decade, clear evidence has been produced showing that 
effective constituency campaigning in British general elections can lead to 
better electoral performance. This evidence has challenged the received 
wisdom that only national campaigning is significant and that efforts at 
local level are meaningless rituals. Denver et al have focused on the role of 
the national parties in strengthening local campaigns in target seats; Seyd & 
Whiteley, by contrast, have stressed the importance of local party 
membership. This article attempts to assess the relative electoral impact of 
national party co-ordination and constituency party membership and 
suggests that the impact of these two factors varies by party. 
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, the role and impact of constituency campaigning in British 
general elections have been fundamentally re-assessed.  Three different teams of 
researchers (for brevity referred to as: Seyd & Whiteley; Johnston & Pattie; Denver 
& Hands), using three different methodologies, have arrived at broadly similar 
conclusions - effective local campaigning, in most cases, leads to a better electoral 
performance.  These results have not only confirmed previous findings in the United 
States (see, for example: Crotty, 1971; Jacobson, 1980, 1990) but have also challenged 
what was previously the received wisdom put forward, for example, by various 
‘Nuffield’ studies - that only national campaigning is significant and that efforts at local 
level are meaningless rituals - and what was once a ‘revisionist’ position has now 
come to be widely accepted. That said, there have been differences between the three 
teams, not only in methodology but also in their conclusions about whether local 
campaigning ‘works’ for all of the major parties. Originally at least, both Seyd & 
Whiteley and Johnston & Pattie argued that the constituency campaigns of all three 
parties had a significant impact (see, for example Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Pattie, 
Johnston, et al., 1995). Denver & Hands (1997, 1998, 2002) on the other hand, have 
suggested that constituency campaigning by the Conservatives has been notably less 
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effective than campaigning by Labour or the Liberal Democrats: their analyses show 
no discernible effect of Conservative constituency campaigning in 1992 and 1997 
and, at best, a small effect in 2001. 
 
A more significant disagreement has concerned which aspects of constituency 
campaigning are more important in affecting election outcomes.  To a large extent, 
Seyd & Whiteley’s work on campaigning has been a by-product of their ground-
breaking studies of party membership and they have used an index of membership 
activism in constituencies to demonstrate the effectiveness of local campaigns.  
Perhaps partly for this reason, they have stressed the importance of party 
membership.  As they make clear, their index of activism – which is their measure of 
campaign intensity – scores more highly the more constituency members a party has: 
‘a given constituency party could obtain a high intensity score either by having a 
large number of members who are moderately active, or by having a few members 
who are highly active’ (Whiteley and Seyd, 2003, p. 310).  In contrast, Denver & 
Hands have assigned an increasingly important role to the activities of central 
professional party staff in co-ordinating constituency campaigns as a whole, focusing 
resources on key constituencies and modernising campaign organisation at the local 
level.  Of course, both the size of party memberships and increased influence from 
the centre are likely to be of significance: good campaigns cannot be run without a 
substantial voluntary input from members on the ground and the substantially greater 
resources available to the central party organisations clearly give them the potential 
to have a major impact on local campaigning. In this article, however, we seek to 
make some assessment of their relative significance: which makes the greater 
contribution to improved electoral performance at the constituency level?   
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In general, the various components of campaigning are closely related, and 
disaggregating their effects is not an easy matter.  However the nature of the data 
collected by Denver & Hands at the general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2001, on the 
basis of surveys of election agents and organisers, allows us to construct measures of 
the extent to which the national party organisations have sought to exercise central 
involvement in different constituencies, as well as providing reliable estimates of 
constituency party memberships.
1
  Furthermore, it is clear that these two components 
of campaigning are not directly related.  We present more evidence on this below, 
but there is no reason to believe that the constituencies that the national parties seek 
to target will have high levels of party membership or vice versa.  Thus we should be 
able to provide some assessment of the relative importance of central party influence 
and local membership using fairly standard statistical techniques.  It is necessary first 
of all, however, to say rather more about the influence of the central party 
organisations and how we propose to measure it. 
 
Developing a measure of central party influence 
We have a straightforward measure of constituency party membership. In all three 
surveys conducted by Denver and Hands, election agents were asked to give an 
estimate of their local membership at the time of the election – something that they 
were normally in a good position to be able to do.  Comparisons with estimates of 
membership from other sources suggest that these data are reliable (Fisher, 2000). As 
a further test of reliability, levels of membership recorded in 1997 were correlated 
with those recorded in 2001 (this test could only be conducted for the period 1997 to 
2001, as a boundary change after the 1992 election meant that any comparisons 
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would be subject to inaccuracies). The correlation coefficients for the Conservatives, 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats were 0.812, 0.823 and 0.890 respectively. This 
further test suggests that the estimates of local party membership did not vary a great 
deal over time and so can reasonably be regarded as being reliable. 
 
Developing a measure of central party influence or involvement is somewhat more 
difficult, however.  Denver et al (2003) argue, on the basis of qualitative interviews, 
that all of the main parties have increased the extent of central involvement in local 
campaigns over the past decade.  Before the 1990s, the contribution of party 
headquarters was mainly confined to offering training and advice to party workers, 
and providing routine ‘servicing’ – making campaign materials available for 
purchase, for example. Nonetheless, party organisers never entirely subscribed to the 
view that local campaigns were irrelevant.  They were well aware that winning 
marginal seats was crucial to their chances of winning general elections and some 
attempts were made to improve campaigns in these seats by providing extra help 
with election literature, financial assistance, and so on. What has emerged over the 
past ten years, however, is a new and much stronger relationship between the 
national and local campaigns.  National party professionals now seek to exercise 
much greater control over local campaigning by managing key constituency 
campaigns in crucial respects and integrating them much more closely into the 
national effort.  They develop local campaign strategies and build them in as an 
integral part of the party’s overall national campaign; they appoint special organisers 
(or provide centrally-paid agents in the case of the Conservatives) in target 
constituencies and in other ways seek to encourage the development of effective 
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campaigning at the local level; they organise direct mail and telephone canvassing 
from outside the constituency; and so on. These changes began first, and have gone 
furthest, in the Labour party, but both the Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the 
Liberal Democrats, have followed Labour’s lead. As has been argued elsewhere, in 
many respects the initiative in local campaigning in target seats has passed from the 
local party to the national party headquarters (Denver et al 1998).  
 
As suggested above, some of the questions asked by Denver & Hands allow us to 
develop a quantitative measure of the extent of central involvement in local 
campaigns.  It has to be said straight away that this measure is far from perfect.  For 
example, there are no questions which might indicate the extent to which local 
campaigns were integrated into the parties’ national campaigns or provide details of 
the activities of regional and national officials in the constituencies in the inter-
election period.  Nonetheless, there are questions which provide a good indication of 
the extent and variation of central involvement in constituencies.  These deal with: 
 
 the amount of contact by national and regional offices with local organisers 
in the period before the campaign and during the campaign itself;  
 whether a special organiser was appointed by party headquarters to work on 
the local campaign; and  
 whether election software supplied by the party’s headquarters was used in 
the constituency.  
 
All of these questions were asked in each of the 1992, 1997 and 2001 surveys. In the 
1997 and 2001 surveys, questions were added on the length of time before the 
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election that a special organiser had been appointed and on whether there was 
telephone canvassing organised from outside the constituency.  
 
We have used responses to these questions to construct two indexes of central 
involvement in local campaigns.  The first, calculated for each party in each of the 
three elections separately, uses the questions asked in all three surveys (we label this 
the ‘old’ index); the second, again calculated separately for each election, covers 
1997 and 2001 and uses the additional questions asked in the corresponding surveys 
(the ‘new’ index) – details of response categories can be found in the endnotes.2 The 
indexes were calculated as the (standardised) scores for each constituency on the 
basis of a Principal Components Analysis.
3
 For ease of presentation the scores have 
been adjusted to give a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 33.3: campaigns 
having scores greater than 100 had higher than average central involvement, scores 
lower than 100 indicate lower than average central involvement.
4
  We have restricted 
analysis to English constituencies, excluding Scotland and Wales because a number 
of the relevant survey questions involved refer to ‘national’ contacts or ‘party 
headquarters’ and when asked in Scotland and Wales such questions are bound to be 
somewhat ambiguous.  Respondents in these countries might easily think of their 
headquarters in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Cardiff, rather than London, as ‘national’.  
Nationalist respondents, of course, would be certain to do so, not having ‘regional’ 
organisations equivalent to those of the other parties. 
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Are we measuring different things? 
Before attempting to assess the impact of central involvement and local membership 
on electoral performance, we first need to explore the relationship between our two 
variables and make sure that they are not simply replicating the more complete index 
of local campaign intensity used in previous analyses (Denver et al, 2003).  In other 
words, we need to make sure that we are not using apparently different variables to 
measure overall campaign intensity.  To form a judgement about this, we begin by 
correlating the measures of central involvement and local membership with the full 
campaign index for each party in each election. The results are shown in Table 1.  As 
would be expected, there are positive and significant correlations between the full 
index and our other measures in every case.  It is clear, however, that the 
relationships are far from perfect - although Liberal Democrat membership levels do 
correlate very strongly with the full campaign index. It is also worth noting that as 
expected, the correlations between the centralisation indexes and membership (not 
shown) are either weak or non-significant, with the exception of the Liberal 
Democrats, where the relationship is somewhat stronger, though never higher than 
0.3 
   
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
A second way of describing the relationship between the three variables is to regress 
the index of central involvement and local membership levels against the full 
campaign index. The results are shown in Table 2. In order to produce coefficients 
for the independent variables which can easily be compared with each other, natural 
logarithms of the centralisation index and membership were used. This allows for 
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intuitive percentage ‘rate of change’ comparisons to be made. These suggest that the 
relative impact of membership level and central involvement on the production of a 
strong campaign varies by party. First, in each election, the impact of Labour’s 
central involvement is greater than is the case for the other parties. That is also true 
of Labour members (though the impact of Liberal Democrat members in 2001 is 
only marginally smaller). Secondly, whilst for both the Conservatives and Labour, 
members appear to have had a stronger impact on the intensity of campaigns in 
1992, by 1997 and 2001, the reverse was true – centralisation appears to have had a 
greater impact. By way of contrast, members have a consistently stronger impact for 
the Liberal Democrats. Nevertheless, the main conclusion that we wish to draw at 
this stage is that on the basis of these two tests we can be reasonably sure that neither 
the index of central involvement nor the size of party membership is simply another 
way of measuring campaign intensity.  They do not replicate the full index of 
constituency campaign strength. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
The Development of Central Involvement 
A further preliminary question that is worth exploring is the extent to which changes 
in the quantitative indicator of central involvement in constituency campaigning 
corroborate the qualitative evidence outlined above.  To describe change over time 
we have recalculated the original indexes taking all respondents in all the relevant 
elections together (i.e. pooling the data). We do this because the separate election 
indexes are based on standardised scores and thus are not strictly comparable across 
elections.  On this basis, Table 3 compares the mean scores for central involvement 
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for each of the three parties over all three elections using both the old and the new 
indexes.  The data generally confirm the argument advanced on the basis of 
qualitative data. Firstly, the scores suggest that Labour took the lead in trying to 
manage constituency campaigns from the centre.  In both 1992 and 1997 (and on 
both indexes in the latter case) Labour scores are well above the average and clearly 
higher than those for the other parties.  Secondly, the Conservatives appear to have 
learned the appropriate lessons by 2001 – their scores on both indexes rose 
significantly and were, indeed, slightly larger than Labour’s.  Thirdly, although there 
is evidence of increasing central involvement on the part of Liberal Democrat 
headquarters, it is at a much lower level than is the case with the other parties.  This 
is not surprising since although the degree of central involvement exercised from 
Liberal Democrat headquarters has grown, the party simply lacks the resources to do 
very much more than encourage constituency campaigners from the centre. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
We would expect, however, that central involvement would be greatest in key seats 
rather than in those safely held or unlikely to be won. As with the overall measure of 
campaign intensity, what matters is whether the resources and effort are distributed 
effectively across different types of seat – i.e. with most resources concentrated on 
target seats. Previous studies (Denver & Hands, 1997) have shown, for example, that 
although the Conservatives had very strong constituency campaigns overall in 1992, 
their strongest campaigns were in their safest seats.  Of course, parties only have 
limited control over how intense the campaigns are in particular constituencies – 
membership levels, for example, often reflect previous electoral success (Fisher, 
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2000; Fisher et al, 2006).  In theory at least, they have much greater control over the 
targeting of their involvement in local campaigns.  The data in Table 4 show the 
extent to which the parties have been effective in this respect. 
 
In almost every case the central involvement index scores are clearly higher in target 
seats than in the other categories, suggesting that central co-ordinating efforts have 
been successfully focused on the campaigns that matter. The single exception is the 
Liberal Democrats in 2001 (on both the old and new index).  However, this was the 
only occasion on which there were enough safely held Liberal Democrat seats to 
form a separate category.  Even although these appeared safe ‘on paper’, most had 
been originally won by intense campaigning and the party’s headquarters clearly 
maintained a strong interest in the progress of the campaigns in them.  
 
In one sense, of course, all of this might be considered something of a tautology – 
since the ‘centre’ decides which seats are target ones, it is likely that such seats will 
receive most central attention. And, as we have seen, this is largely so. However, 
what we are interested in is not just whether target seats receive most central 
attention, but also the relative difference between seats. As we can see, this varies 
quite considerably. For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats the extent to which 
central co-ordination was focused on target seats in particular increased sharply in 
1997. The figure for Labour campaigns in target seats on the new index (160) is 
especially striking and compares with below average figures in the other categories.  
This is an indicator of the success of ‘Operation Victory’, the party’s overall 
campaign strategy.  For both parties, however, targeting, although still apparent, was 
less striking in 2001.  In the case of Labour the decline in 2001 may reflect the 
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greater inclusiveness of the party’s targeting strategy in that election (Denver et al, 
2002), but for both parties it also seems likely to reflect the changed political 
context: both had many more seats to defend following their successes in 1997 and, 
as a result, a significantly larger number of seats were targeted.  Labour, for 
example, had 148 targets as compared with 90 in 1997.  It is almost inevitable in 
these circumstances that centrally managed targeting of resources will be less 
effective.  The figures suggest, however, that the Conservatives have steadily 
improved their effectiveness over the three elections – in spite of the fact that they 
also had many more targets in 2001 (180 compared with 100 in 1997) – which 
confirms our earlier suggestion that they have learned lessons and have, to a 
significant extent, ‘caught up’ with Labour. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
For the sake of comparison, we show in Table 5 the distribution of party members 
between target and non-target seats.   There is not a lot that parties can do centrally 
to affect these figures, which are more likely to be a product of local contexts, but 
the data enable us to indicate the extent to which party members are distributed 
‘efficiently’, so to speak.  The evidence here suggests that both Labour and the 
Liberal Democrat campaigning may have benefited by having relatively large 
memberships in their target seats. Perhaps the most striking thing about the figures 
for the Conservatives is the sharp fall in membership over the period, but even in 
2001 they had, on average, almost double the number of members in safe seats that 
they had in their targets.  The figures also suggest that the Liberal Democrats may 
struggle to make further breakthroughs in what are currently non-target seats.  The 
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analysis presented in Table 2 showed that strong Liberal Democrat campaigns are 
heavily dependent on high membership levels, yet the party’s mean membership 
level in ‘not held not target’ seats is relatively small. 
 
[Table 5 About Here]  
 
The Electoral Impact 
We now return to the central concern of this article - the relative electoral impact of 
central party involvement and party membership.  We return to the original index 
scores and use straightforward methods to explore this question, starting with simple 
bivariate correlations.  We have argued elsewhere that the most suitable measure of 
party performance in this context is change in share of the electorate won between 
two elections (Denver et al, 2002;2003).  However, because of boundary changes it 
is not possible to calculate change in share of the electorate figures for 1997, and we 
also report, therefore, analyses based on change in share of the vote in the three 
elections.   
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
 
The correlation coefficients reported in Table 6 suggest that Conservative attempts at 
central co-ordination have had singularly little impact on their electoral performance.  
None of the coefficients with the index of central involvement are statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, where the coefficients for local party membership are 
significant the signs are in the wrong direction: higher memberships (found in the 
safest seats, of course) are associated with poorer performances.   In contrast, in both 
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1992 and 1997 Labour’s electoral performance was positively and significantly 
correlated with the extent of central involvement and also with membership levels.  
In 2001, however, central involvement had no significant impact and larger 
memberships were associated with significantly worse performances.  Central 
involvement on the part of the Liberal Democrats is associated with better 
performances in 1997 and 2001, as is membership in 1992 and 1997.  In 2001, 
however, larger memberships were associated with larger declines in the share of the 
electorate obtained. 
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
 
The most economical and widely used
5
 way to control for the socio-economic 
composition of constituencies is to use share of the vote or electorate at the relevant 
election as the dependent variable (rather than change in share) and share of the vote 
or electorate at the previous election as a control variable.  This effectively controls 
for a range of socio-economic variables associated with variations in party support 
across constituencies.  Table 7 reports partial correlations on this basis.  As can be 
seen, the relationships between the central involvement index and Conservative 
performance remain non-significant.  In the case of the Liberal Democrats, the 
coefficients are generally somewhat stronger than in Table 6 and, in particular, the 
relationships between performance and both independent variables are now positive 
and significant.  For Labour, all measures now suggest that central involvement had 
a positive impact on performance in 2001.  On the other hand, the relationships 
between membership and performance in 2001 remain negative. 
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Finally, in Table 8 we introduce into the analysis two additional control variables 
which are likely to affect party performance but which are not captured by share of 
the vote or electorate at the previous election: region and personal incumbency.
6
 The 
dependent variables are share of the electorate in 1992 and 2001, and share of the 
vote in 1997, with the corresponding figures for the previous election as controls.
7
  
The data were analysed using stepwise multiple regression and, for each party at 
each election, with central involvement and membership being the key predictor 
variables.   It is worth noting that these are stiff tests of the impact of the two 
independent variables as the control variables alone produce very large r-squared 
figures.
8
 
 
[Table 8 About Here] 
 
The variables reported in Table 8 are logarithms (as in Table 2) and, for clarity of 
presentation and ease of interpretation, only coefficients for the key variables that are 
included as significant in the final equation are shown.
9
 The results suggest, first, 
that despite the improvements achieved by the Conservatives in the central 
coordination of constituency campaigns, this does not appear to have led to any 
measurable electoral payoff.  The only positive coefficient in the Conservative 
equations is for the size of constituency party membership in 1997.  For Labour, on 
these figures, central involvement appears to have had no independent impact on 
party performance in 1992, but was significantly and positively related to 
performance in both 1997 and 2001.  By way of contrast, whilst Labour membership 
levels were positively related in 1992, in 2001 the relationship is negative.  Things 
are more straightforward in the case of the Liberal Democrats.  Somewhat 
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paradoxically given the relatively small input of party headquarters to constituency 
campaigns, the central involvement index is related to party performance in both 
1997 and 2001.  On the other hand, membership impacts on performance in all three 
elections. However, whilst membership still had a greater impact than centralisation 
in 1997, by 2001, the impact of the latter had become more important. 
 
Conclusion 
It must be stressed again that the index of central involvement that we have used 
here cannot entirely capture all the features of increased central influence that we 
have described elsewhere using qualitative analysis (Denver et al, 2003).  
Nonetheless, it is useful and tends to corroborate the argument that in all three 
parties the influence of national officials over local campaigning has increased.  The 
analysis of the impact of central involvement on electoral outcomes broadly 
confirms previous analyses of the impact of campaign intensity more generally.  In 
spite of the considerable efforts made by Conservative Central Office in 1997 and 
2001 these bore little fruit.  This may reflect the relative autonomy and independence 
of Conservative Associations, which tend to be resistant to what may be seen as 
central ‘interference’.  On the other hand, in both 1997 and 2001 central involvement 
does appear to have had a significant impact on both Labour and Liberal Democrat 
performance.  Assessing the results for party membership is a little more difficult – 
but in the case of the Liberal Democrats things seem clear enough.  The party has 
done well where it has built up strong local membership.  It is not surprising, then 
that having controlled for previous performance, region and incumbency, there is a 
fairly strong relationship between size of membership and Liberal Democrat 
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performance at each election, although by 2001 the impact of central influence had 
become greater. 
 
The figures for Labour are more puzzling.  Given the considerable effort that the 
party has put into developing centralised co-ordination of the constituency effort in 
key seats, we would expect to find - and do - significant relationships between the 
party’s performance and the index of central involvement.  The negative relationship 
between membership and performance in 2001 remains something of a mystery, 
however.  As we have seen, the negative effect remains, even when we control for 
previous performance, region and incumbency.  It is the case that in 2001 Labour did 
least well in its safest seats, and these in general are where it has its highest 
membership levels.  This may have resulted from confidence in these areas that the 
election was going to be won easily or from the fact that little campaign effort was 
made in safe seats.  Perhaps it may also reflect some disillusion with the government 
among activists in Labour heartlands. Whatever the reason, this result certainly casts 
doubts on Seyd & Whiteley’s view that party membership is the key to successful 
local campaigns. To be sure, Seyd & Whiteley are correct in asserting that active 
members are more significant with regard to electoral payoffs than non-active ones. 
However, their assertion that large numbers of moderately active members will 
deliver as many electoral benefits as a small number of very active one seems 
contestable on the basis of these findings. Instead, they reinforce the view expressed 
elsewhere (Denver & Hands, 2004) that, certainly in the case of the Labour party, the 
crucial factor leading to more effective local campaigning has been the role played 
by the party’s central organisation in encouraging and helping to modernise 
campaigning in the key constituencies. 
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Table 1 
 
Correlations Between Full Campaign Index, Central Involvement Indexes and 
Membership Levels  
 
 Central Inv. Central Inv.  Number of 
 Index (Old) Index (New)  Members (Ns) 
 
Con Campaign Index 1992 0.144 * n/a 0.517 ** (218/198) 
Con Campaign Index 1997 0.161 ** 0.190 ** 0.521 ** (364/338) 
Con Campaign Index 2001 0.361 ** 0.435 ** 0.571 ** (249/228) 
 
Lab Campaign Index 1992 0.315 ** n/a 0.591 ** (294/281) 
Lab Campaign Index 1997 0.418 ** 0.538 ** 0.401 ** (386/372) 
Lab Campaign Index 2001 0.363 ** 0.521 ** 0.256 ** (300/287) 
 
Lib Dem Campaign Index 1992 0.243 ** n/a 0.745 ** (313/307) 
Lib Dem Campaign Index 1997 0.375 ** 0.477 ** 0.841 ** (344/332) 
Lib Dem Campaign Index 2001 0.290 ** 0.393 ** 0.787 ** (294/282) 
 
Notes  ** = p< 0.01; *= p<0.05.  The two Ns shown refer to the coefficients involving the indices on 
the one hand and party membership on the other. 
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Table 2  
Impact on Overall Campaign Intensity 
 
 Central Inv. Membership Adjusted R2 (N) 
Con 1992   9.072 15.097 0.489 (198) 
Con 1997 16.166 14.462 0.515 (338) 
Con 2001 29.905 16.289 0.623 (228) 
 
Lab 1992 15.063 33.829 0.368 (281) 
Lab 1997 32.113 30.773 0.335 (372) 
Lab 2001 41.033 23.444 0.379 (287) 
 
Lib Dem 1992 10.835 20.764 0.558 (306) 
Lib Dem 1997 13.467 23.275 0.670 (331) 
Lib Dem 2001 15.684 22.507 0.582 (282) 
 
Notes: The variables for central involvement and membership are logarithms. All coefficients are 
significant at the p<0.01 level.  The ‘new’ Central Involvement index is used for 2001 and 1997 and 
the ‘old’ index for 1992 
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Table 3 
Variations in the Extent of Central Involvement 1992-2001 
 
 Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat 
Old Index (Std Dev)    
1992  100 (35.0) 108 (29.5) 86 (29.3) 
1997 102 (33.7) 107 (32.5) 87 (28.9) 
2001 112 (32.7) 108 (33.1) 91 (31.5) 
New Index (Std Dev)    
1997 99 (31.7) 106 (35.5) 86 (27.8) 
2001 110 (31.3) 109 (34.7) 90 (25.2) 
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Table 4 Central Involvement by Seat Status 
 
 Held Not Target Target Not Held Not Target (Ns) 
Conservatives    
1992 Old Index 98 112 97
 (131/32/55) 
1997 Old Index 95 127 101
 (164/54/146) 
2001 Old Index 109 129 105 (93/74/82) 
1997 New Index 92 125 98
 (164/54/146) 
2001 New Index 105 132 103 (93/74/82) 
 
Labour    
1992 Old Index 101 121 103
 (63/86/145) 
1997 Old Index 99 149 100
 (121/59/206) 
2001 Old Index 101 129 99
 (113/74/113) 
1997 New Index 95 160 97
 121/59/206) 
2001 New Index 101 137 98
 (113/74/113) 
 
Liberal Democrats    
1992 Old Index N/A 92 85 (-/22/291) 
1997 Old Index N/A 126 84 (-/23/322) 
2001 Old Index 124 113 90 (4/19/271) 
1997 New Index N/A 126 83 (-/23/322) 
2001 New Index 120 114 86 (4/19/271) 
 
Notes:  The Ns shown are for each column.  There were too few Liberal Democrat seats held but not 
targeted in 1992 and 1997 for separate analysis. 
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Table 5 Party Members (mean) by Seat Status 
 
 Held Not Target Target Not Held Not Target (Ns) 
 
Conservatives    
1992 2368 957 326
 (124/25/49) 
1997 1271 774 247
 (150/52/136) 
2001 1185 618 201 (85/69/74) 
Labour   
1992 540 561 367
 (58/84/139) 
1997 754 729 505
 (116/58/198) 
2001 635 524 356
 (107/72/108) 
Liberal Democrats    
1992 N/A 433 163 (-/22/285) 
1997 N/A 585 144 (-/22/311) 
2001 438 447 107 (4/18/260) 
 
Notes:  The Ns shown are for each column.  There were too few Liberal Democrat seats held but not 
targeted in 1992 and 1997 for separate analysis. 
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Table 6 
The Electoral Impact of Central Involvement and Number of Party Members 
(Bivariate Correlations)  
 
 Change in  Change in 
 Share of the  Share of the  
 Vote  Electorate (N) 
Conservative   
 1992 Old Index -0.069 -0.073 (218) 
 1997 New Index 0.008 x (364) 
 2001 New Index -0.090 -0.063 (249) 
 Members 1992 -0.193** 0.105 (198) 
 Members 1997 -0.138* x (338) 
 Members 2001 0.120 -0.165* (228) 
Labour   
 1992 Old Index 0.172** 0.183** (294) 
 1997 New Index 0.203** x (386) 
 2001 New Index 0.102 -0.032 (300) 
 Members 1992 0.257** 0.209** (281) 
 Members 1997 0.131* x (372) 
 Members 2001 -0.308** -0.316** (287) 
Liberal Democrats   
 1992 Old Index 0.149 0.129 (313) 
 1997 New Index 0.219** x (345) 
 2001 New Index 0.127* 0.031 (294) 
 Members 1992 0.390** 0.424** (307) 
 Members 1997 0.406** x (333) 
 Members 2001 -0.047 -0.278** (282) 
 
Notes: x = not available. ** = p< 0.01, * = p<0.05.  Changes in constituency boundaries mean that 
changes in electorate share cannot be calculated for 1997. 
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Table 7 
The Electoral Impact of Central Involvement and Number of Party Members 
(Partial Correlations)  
 Share of the Share of the 
 Vote  Electorate (N) 
Conservatives   
 1992 Old Index -0.080 -0.066 (215) 
 1997 New Index -0.057 x (361) 
 2001 New Index -0.101 -0.029 (246) 
 Members 1992 -0.163* -0.134 (195) 
 Members 1997 0.232** x (335) 
 Members 2001 0.054 0.140* (225) 
Labour   
 1992 Old Index 0.152* 0.181** (291) 
 1997 New Index 0.194** x (383) 
 2001 New Index 0.150** 0.188** (297) 
 Members 1992 0.201** 0.178** (278) 
 Members 1997 0.104** x (369) 
 Members 2001 -0.216** -0.127* (284) 
Liberal Democrats   
 1992 Old Index 0.078 0.079 (310) 
 1997 New Index 0.275** x (342) 
 2001 New Index 0.194** 0.185** (291) 
 Members 1992 0.529** 0.539** (304) 
 Members 1997 0.576** x (330) 
 Members 2001 0.238** 0.281** (279) 
 
Notes: x = not available. ** = p< 0.01, * = p<0.05.  Changes in constituency boundaries mean that 
changes in electorate share cannot be calculated for 1997. 
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Table 8 
The Electoral Impact of Central Involvement & Numbers of Party Members 
(Multiple Regression Analysis) 
 
 Central Inv.   
 Index Members 
Conservatives 
 1992 x x 
 1997 x 0.678 
 2001 x x 
 
Labour 
 1992 x 0.924 
 1997 1.771 x 
 2001 0.988 -0.812 
 
Liberal Democrats 
 1992 x 2.037 
 1997 1.588 1.774 
 2001 1.039 0.684 
 
Note: The variables for central involvement and membership are logarithms. x = Not significant.  
Minimum N as per Table 2. 
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Notes 
 
1. The surveys referred to in the paper were conducted in connection with ESRC-supported 
studies of constituency campaigning (grant reference numbers Y304 25 3004 (1992); 
R000222027 (1997) and R000239396 (2001)). 
 
2. The variables included in the calculation of the indices measuring central involvement 
are as follows:  
 
‘Old’ Index 
 
 Amount of National contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, Once 
a Month, Once a Week) 
 Amount of Regional contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, 
Once a Month, Once a Week) 
 Amount of National contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, 
Every Day) 
 Amount of Regional contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, 
Every Day) 
 Whether used election software supplied by party headquarters (Yes/No) 
 Whether special organiser appointed from centre (Yes/No) 
 
‘New’ Index (1997 and 2001) 
 
 Amount of National contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, Once 
a Month, Once a Week) 
 Amount of Regional contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, 
Once a Month, Once a Week) 
 Amount of National contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, 
Every Day) 
 Amount of Regional contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, 
Every Day) 
 Whether used election software supplied by party headquarters (Yes/No) 
 Length of time special organiser appointed before election (Just Before the 
Election, Within the Last 6 Months, Within the Last Year, Over a Year Ago) 
 Whether there was telephone canvassing from outside constituency (1997) 
(Yes/No) 
 Whether there was outside telephone canvassing before the campaign (2001) 
(Yes/No) 
 Whether there was outside telephone canvassing during the campaign (2001) 
(Yes/No) 
 
3. This is preferable to using a simple additive scale, since such scales treat all 
components equally in the calculation of the index. 
 
4. This adjustment involves multiplying the factor score by 33.3 and then adding 100. 
 
5. The use of a lagged variable creates a dynamic specification of the model, which 
controls for the effects of the independent variables at the previous election. See, for 
example Whiteley & Seyd, 1998, p.123.  
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6. Region was analysed by a series of dummy variables for each of the standard regions 
in England with the West Midlands omitted as the comparator.  Incumbency was also 
measured as a dummy variable. 
 
7. Although the data are pooled to produce comparable centralisation index scores, it is 
necessary to run the models on an ‘election by election’ basis, rather that using 
interaction terms, as the dependent variable for 1997 (share of vote) differs from that 
of 1992 and 2001 (share of the electorate) because of boundary changes. 
 
8. The Adjusted r2 figures for equations predicting each party’s vote/electorate share in 
each election on the basis of share in the previous election, region and incumbency are 
as follows: 
 
  1992 1997 2001 
 
 Conservative 0.966 0.951 0.943 
 Labour  0.943 0.943 0.924 
 Liberal Democrats 0.836 0.866 0.882 
 
 
9. Full tables containing all variables are available from the authors on request. 
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